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 Central to cultivation theory is the premise that television's recurrent narrative, visual, 
and ideological patterns cultivate viewers' (mis)constructions of the real world in a manner 
positively correlated with the amount and types of exposure.  This study tested that premise 
by examining the relationships between and among crime drama viewing, perceptions of the 
effectiveness of the U.S. criminal justice system, and scientific literacy via an analytical web-
based survey of 1,365 undergraduate students.  Contrary to the cultivation thesis, few 
significant and no strong associations emerged between or among any of the study’s main 
variables; in other words, little evidence of cultivation effects or processes was manifest in 
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INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Introduction 
 Every time we turn on our televisions, we are bombarded with information.  Some of 
this information is fact, some is fiction, and much is to be found along the great continuum 
between.  What audiences perceive to be true and what actually is true, of course, do not 
always (or perhaps even often) coincide; and it is the aim of cultivation research to describe, 
explain, and predict the cumulative effects of television exposure on viewers' 
(mis)conceptions of social reality. 
 Central to cultivation theory is the premise that television's recurrent narrative, visual, 
and ideological patterns cultivate viewers' constructions of the real world in a manner 
positively correlated with the amount and types of exposure.  This study tested that premise 
by examining the influence of forensics-focused police procedural programs on audience 
perceptions about the effectiveness of the U.S. criminal justice system as moderated by 
audience members’ understanding of and attitudes toward science—or, more succinctly, by 
their scientific literacy. 
 Setting the stage for this investigation are both the explosive popularity of the crime 
drama genre1 (Nielsen, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010) and the importance of and need for scientific 
                                                 
1For each of the past four years, two of Nielsen’s top ten most-viewed regularly scheduled primetime television 
programs have been police procedurals: CSI and CSI: Miami in 2007, CSI and NCIS in 2008, and NCIS and 
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literacy in an age of rapid scientific and technological advancement.  As debates rage on 
about stem cell research, genetically modified organisms, and the teaching of evolution in 
schools (among countless other issues), it becomes clear that “meaningful citizen 
participation [in a democratic society] requires a level of civic scientific literacy sufficient to 
understand the essential points of competing arguments and to evaluate or assess these 
arguments” (Miller, 2000, p. 24).  But is the forensic fiction of CSI and other widely viewed 
police procedural programs2 affecting audiences’ interest in and understanding of science?  
Furthermore, is viewer scientific literacy moderating the cultivating effects of the crime 
drama genre?   
The following literature review examines cultivation theory, relevant genre-specific 
cultivation research, and the concept of scientific literacy, providing context for the present 
study and giving rise to its hypotheses. 
 
Cultivation Theory and Research 
Historical Context 
 The rise of television in America took place against the tumultuous backdrop of the 
1940s, 50s, and 60s.  Burgeoning in a time of warfare and social unrest, the new medium 
ascended to ubiquity in the wake of World War II and the second Red Scare and amidst 
profound changes in American society.  WWII transformed the country “from a primarily 
rural society boasting an agriculturally based economy into a largely urban nation dependent 
on an industrially based economy” (Baran & Davis, 2008, p. 178) and ushered the United 
                                                                                                                                                       
NCIS: Los Angeles in 2009 and 2010.   
 
2The terms “police procedural” and “crime drama” are used interchangeably throughout this paper to denote 
CSI-type programs (i.e., those depicting the work of police detectives and forensic scientists as they investigate 
and solve crimes).   
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States into position as “the undisputed economic, social, and technological leader of the 
world” (Baran & Davis, 2008, p. 165).  By 1960, 90% of U.S. homes had at least one 
television set (Baran & Davis, 2008), and “the U.S. economy roared, homes and suburbs 
were built, college enrollment soared, and new television networks and interstate highways 
linked America in nationwide optimism” (Baran & Davis, 2008, p. 165).  Theories of mass 
communication shifted from direct-effects, “hypodermic needle” models birthed from fear of 
communism, fascism, propaganda, and pervasive new technologies (such as and indeed 
especially the broadcast media) to more reasonable, indirect-effects models allowing that the 
mass media represent only a part of our social system and that media effects, therefore, are 
counterbalanced—limited—by the influence of society's other institutions, such as the family, 
school, and church (Baran & Davis, 2008).         
 Nevertheless, the 1960s brought a dichotomy of sanguine advancement and tremulous 
apprehension as rapid change supplanted social order.  The African-American Civil Rights 
Movement, Women's Liberation, and protests of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War—all 
of which were made well and widely known to the American public via television, with an 
immediacy possible only through the new medium's real-time, audiovisual delivery—
threatened the long-established status quo; and the violence that accompanied these 
movements—particularly the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy in 1963 and the 
Reverend Dr.  Martin Luther King, Jr. in 1968—left many looking for the proverbial root of 
society's evils.  “Again and again critics arose who blamed many of the problems on media.  
Media fomented racial unrest, they said; media encouraged young people to challenge adult 
authority” (Baran & Davis, 2008, p. 165).  Politicians, citizens, and media researchers 
debated the role of television in inciting social instability and violence, and the federal 
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government established the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence 
in 1968 and the Surgeon General's Scientific Advisory Committee on Television and Social 
Behavior in 1969 to ascertain whether the media were harmful to society, granting funding to 
a wide variety of research efforts on the individual- and societal-level effects of television 
violence (Baran & Davis, 2008).   
 One such effort was The Violence Index, an annual content analysis of a sample week 
of prime time network programming conducted to determine how much violence was 
actually present on television.  The Index was carried out by a group of researchers at the 
University of Pennsylvania led by George Gerbner, a Hungarian native who had immigrated 
to the United States in the late 1930s and who worked as a journalist and fought for the U.S. 
in WWII before earning his doctorate and becoming a professor of communications.  The 
Violence Index  generated considerable controversy as debates raged about the definition of 
violence, the rationale behind analyzing only television violence and not, say, racism and 
sexism, and the point of undertaking such analysis when the link between television violence 
and audience behavior remained conspicuously absent (Baran & Davis, 2008).  Gerbner and 
his colleagues addressed these challenges in 1973, redefining their work as the Cultural 
Indicators Project, a three-part research framework for investigating the structure, contours, 
and consequences of pervasive systems of symbols, premised on three global, interrelated 
questions: 
1 What are the processes, pressures, and constraints that influence and 
underlie the production of mass media content? 
 
2 What are the dominant, aggregate patterns of images, messages, facts, 
values, and lessons expressed in media messages?  and 
 
3 What is the relationship between attention to these messages and audiences' 
conceptions of social reality?  (Shanahan, Gerbner, & Morgan, 1999, pp. 6-7) 
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 The now-defunct first prong, “institutional process analysis” (Gerbner, 1973), 
examined how media messages are selected, produced, and distributed.  The second prong, 
“message system analysis” (Gerbner, 1973), quantifies and tracks recurrent images in 
television content.  The final prong, “cultivation analysis” (Gerbner, 1973), studies how 
exposure to the television world contributes to viewers' conceptions of the real world and is 
the basis for cultivation theory.  The Cultural Indicators Project continues (sans the first 
prong) into the present, making it the longest-running continuous media research project in 
the world.  George Gerbner died in 2005.   
Cultivation Theory 
 Cultivation theory was developed to “help us understand the consequences of 
growing up and living in a cultural environment dominated by television” (Morgan, 
Shanahan, & Signorielli, 2009, p. 34), and cultivation research seeks to explain how 
television, which “has become the common symbolic environment” (Gerbner, 1998, p. 192), 
shapes audience views of reality.  The central hypothesis guiding such research is that, after 
controlling for demographic characteristics, those who watch more television are “more 
likely to perceive the real world in ways that reflect the most common and recurrent 
messages of the television world” (Shanahan et al., 1999, p. 4).  The premises upon which 
this cultivation hypothesis is based are as follows: 
1. “[T]elevision is the central cultural arm of American society” (Gerbner & 
Gross, 1976, p. 126). 
 Gerbner, Gross, Jackson-Beeck, Jeffries-Fox, and Signorielli (1978) argued that 
television is “the chief creator of synthetic cultural patterns (entertainment and information) 
for the most heterogeneous mass publics in history, including large groups that have never 
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shared in any common public message systems” (p. 178), largely due to the fact that it differs 
so fundamentally from other media: 
Unlike print, television does not require literacy.  Unlike the movies, 
television is “free” (supported by a privately imposed tax on all goods), and it 
is always running.  Unlike radio, television can show as well as tell.  Unlike 
the theater, concerts, movies, and even churches, television does not require 
mobility.  It comes into the home and reaches individuals directly.  With its 
virtually unlimited access from cradle to grave, television both precedes 
reading and, increasingly, preempts it.  (Gerbner & Gross, 1976, p. 127)  
 
Because television has traditionally been more accessible (and indeed more pervasive) than 
other media, it arguably possesses both relatively greater potential and wider scope as an 
agent of socialization.  This socialization occurs incrementally over time as viewers are 
continually exposed to television's uniform system of relatively generic, formulaic, cyclical, 
and repetitive messages, as indicated in the second premise of cultivation theory: 
2. “The common message systems composing that world [of television] 
present a coherent image of life and society” (Gerbner, Gross, Eleey, Jackson-
Beeck, Jeffries-Fox, & Signorielli, 1977, pp. 22-23). 
 Most of what we know comes not from our own experiences but from the stories we   
hear—stories that tell us how things work, what things are, and what we should do; stories 
that socialize us into and accustom us to roles of gender, class, or vocation (among countless 
others); stories that “weave the seamless web of the cultural environment that cultivates most 
of what we think, what we do, and how we conduct our affairs” (Shanahan et al., 1999, p. ix).  
Indeed, as Gerbner and Gross (1976) pointed out, 
[h]ow many of us have ever been in an operating room, a criminal courtroom, 
a police station or jail, a corporate board room, or a movie studio?  How much 
of what we know about such diverse spheres of activity, about how various 
kinds of people work and what they do—how much of our real world has been 




 Humans have always used storytelling as a method and medium of entertainment, 
education, and socialization; this is hardly a new phenomenon.  What is comparatively novel 
is, in essence, the institutionalization of storytelling.  Television presents a centralized 
system of storytelling in which the stories have become byproducts of marketing; Gerbner 
(1998) asserted that broadcast television is “the most concentrated, homogenized, and 
globalized medium,” as two thirds of all network television programming is paid for by the 
top 100 U.S. advertisers (p. 176).  “Four networks,” he contended, “allied to giant 
transnational corporations—our private 'Ministry of Culture'—control the bulk of production 
and distribution and shape the cultural mainstream” (1998, p. 176).  For this reason, some 
choose to classify cultivation as a critical theory, a theory of social control (Shanahan et al., 
1999).  Because the institutions of mass media are owned and controlled by economic and 
social elites—defined by Shanahan et al. (1999) as both dominant organizations and, to a 
lesser extent, the individuals who play a part in those organizations’ institutional rule 
structures (p.  16)—the viewpoints disseminated by the media systemically favor the 
viewpoints of the elite, indoctrinating—cultivating—audiences accordingly.  After all, 
cultivation occurs independently of the source(s), motive(s), and even the veracity of 
individual messages and of the system of messages as a whole.  Institutional process analysis, 
the discontinued first prong of the Cultural Indicators Project, explored this facet of 
cultivation. 
 Most cultivation theorists, however, would assert that more than a theory of social 
control, cultivation is a theory of media influence (Shanahan et al., 1999).  The term 
influence is used in contrast to effects, as traditional media effects research is concerned with 
and indeed defined as a matter of short-term change:  
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Traditional effects research is based on evaluating specific informational, 
educational, political, or marketing efforts in terms of selective exposure and 
measurable before/after differences between those exposed to some messages 
and others not exposed.  Scholars steeped in those traditions find it difficult to 
accept the emphasis of cultivation on total immersion rather than selective 
viewing.  (Morgan et al., 2009, p. 37)  
 
 Cultivation is not a unidirectional, monolithic process (e.g., Gerbner, 1998; Morgan et 
al., 2009).  Instead, cultivation—which occurs as the triumvirate of television reality, 
viewers' personal realities (both subjective and objective), and factual reality coincide in a 
complex web of multivariate effects—is “a continual, dynamic ongoing process of 
interaction among messages, audiences, and contexts” (Morgan et al., 2009, p. 38).  
Cultivation patterns are not static, and cultivation analysis does not discount the socializing 
effects of institutions other than television.  Direct experience plays a significant role in 
shaping individuals' worldviews; those who live in high-crime areas, for example, exhibit 
greater fear of crime, regardless of how much television they watch.  Heavy television 
viewers living in such areas, however, demonstrate the highest levels of fear:  “this is a 
phenomenon… called 'resonance,' in which everyday reality and television provide a 'double 
dose' of messages that 'resonate' and amplify cultivation” (Gerbner, 1998, p. 182).   
 In addition to personal experience, families, friends, colleagues, schools, churches, 
and countless other people, organizations, and circumstances also exert varying degrees of 
influence on individuals, limiting the direct influence of television.  Heavy television viewing, 
however, “may absorb or override differences in perspectives and behavior which ordinarily 
stem from other factors and influences” (Gerbner, 1998, p. 183) via a process called 
“mainstreaming.”  
The notions of resonance and mainstreaming represent variations in cultivation theory 
designed to accommodate the world outside of and beyond the symbolic environment of 
9 
 
television.  They can occur individually or in tandem, and both processes are apparent in 
viewer development of “mean world syndrome,” perhaps the most well-documented 
cultivation effect.  In collecting responses to the now-iconic Mean World Index,3 Gerbner, 
Gross, Morgan, and Signorielli (1980) found that overall, heavy television viewers were 
more likely to see the world as a mean place than were light viewers.  Moreover, less-
educated, less-affluent viewers tended to see the world as meaner than did their better-
educated, wealthier counterparts (resonance).  Heavy viewers in the educated and affluent 
group, however, rated the world as being just as mean as did low-education, low-income 
individuals (mainstreaming).         
 Cultivation analysis primarily utilizes data gathered from surveys (as well as the 
occasional field experiment) to investigate the relationship between media messages and 
viewers' social reality judgments, commonly called the “cultivation differential;” it does not 
involve laboratory experiments and causal attributions.  In fact, cultivation analysis was 
developed specifically to address the shortcomings of more traditional effects research such 
as Albert Bandura's famous Bobo doll studies (1965), in which young children were exposed 
to videos of adult models committing a series of aggressive acts against a Bobo doll and 
either being rewarded, punished, or experiencing no consequences.  The children were then 
given opportunity to imitate this aggressive behavior, and many of the children who had 
watched the model be rewarded or go unpunished did.  This led Bandura to develop social 
cognitive (also known as social learning) theory, which, in short, predicts that behavior can 
be and is often learned socially, by observing others' behaviors and the accompanying 
outcomes and either imitating (modeling) or avoiding those behaviors accordingly.      
                                                 
3(1) Do you believe that most people are just looking out for themselves?  (2) Do you think that you can’t be too 
careful in dealing with people?  (3) Do you think that most people would take advantage of you if they got the 
chance?   
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 Like Gerbner's Violence Index, Bandura's work was funded by government grants 
and sought to ascertain the impact of television violence on audiences (and, by extension, 
whether or not television posed a public health hazard).  Gerbner and his colleagues, however, 
viewed Bandura's and similar research as overly simplistic, largely unrealistic, strictly short-
term, and having “more to do with theories of observational learning than with violence” 
(Shanahan et al., 1999, p. 9).  “Indeed,” Shanahan et al. (1999) argued, “in most such studies, 
there is no need to know anything about the institution of television, or its status as a cultural 
object, or how people typically use it, to be able to interpret the results” (p. 9).  Truly a 
theory of television, cultivation was designed to complement and supplement traditional 
effects research in order to help paint a better and more accurate picture of television's role in 
society.   
Criticisms and Shortcomings 
 Cultivation analysis was—and certainly is—not without its critics, however.  The first 
public criticism of the Cultural Indicators was voiced by television industry researchers, who 
accused the project's definition of “violence” of being too general or vague (Shanahan et al., 
1999).  The first academic criticism followed in 1978 with Newcomb's “humanistic critique,” 
in which the author argued that because symbols are complex and subject to interpretation 
and because individual contexts, viewers, and programs differ, in-depth examination and 
analysis of these symbols and differences would be more meaningful than the Cultural 
Indicators' broad focus on television messages and audiences as aggregates.  Gerbner and 
Gross (1979) responded, claiming that if our concepts of communication and culture are to 
have any meaning, television's messages must eventually be understood by viewers in 
common ways.  They asserted that the value of studying singular messages and their effects 
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on individuals (a “micro” approach) does not cancel out the value of studying the system of 
messages and its impact on society at large (a “macro” approach); in essence, Gerbner and 
Gross (1979) declared, “Newcomb's big question, 'what does violence mean to the 
respondents' is not only irrelevant but distracting” (p. 227) to cultivation analysis. 
 Cultivation theory has also periodically been accused of being “spurious;” the first 
such imputation is attributed to Doob and Macdonald (1979), who concluded from survey 
data that the relationship between fear of crime and heavy television viewing was simply an 
artifact of actual neighborhood crime levels.  After all, people who live in high-crime areas 
would not only be more afraid of crime but would also be more likely to spend time indoors, 
engaged in safe activities—watching television, for example.  As mentioned previously, 
Gerbner et al. (1980) also found stronger correlation between fear of crime and heavy 
viewing for individuals living in dangerous neighborhoods; they interpreted the data, 
however, as an example of resonance.   
 Indeed, Gerbner and his colleagues had a rebuttal for every criticism; and when 
Hughes (1980) and Hirsch (1980, 1981) reanalyzed some of the data reported in Violence 
Profiles 8 and 9 (Gerbner et al., 1977, 1978), academic discourse gave way to “fierce, 
prolonged battles, occasionally acrimonious and vituperative.  The controversies consumed 
literally hundreds of pages of scholarly journals; the repercussions were felt at academic 
conferences and even spilled over into such popular media as Time magazine” (Shanahan et 
al., 1999, p. 70).  Most of the fighting was centered on methodological issues, most notably 
the proper use of statistical controls in cultivation analysis.  Some of these criticisms were 
legitimate and led to methodological improvements in cultivation research.  Others merely 
spiraled into an embarrassing display of name-calling and finger-pointing and remain, to this 
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day, unresolved; it is still unclear, for example, whether mainstreaming is in fact a function 
of cultivation or, as Hirsch (1981) posited, simply a statistical artifact (regression to the 
mean). 
 More recent challenges to cultivation (e.g., Bryant, 1986; Potter, 1993) often impeach 
its applicability in a changing media landscape, as the advent of “cable and satellite networks, 
VCRs, DVDs, DVRs, and the Internet have brought a significant erosion in audience share 
(and revenue) for the old “Big Three” broadcasting networks and have altered the marketing 
and distribution of programming” (Morgan et al., 2009, p. 45).  Skeptics of cultivation theory 
argue that television is no longer the common symbolic environment nor indeed the “cultural 
arm” of American society; proponents counter that 
[d]espite the never-ending proliferation of channels and alternative media 
‘delivery systems,’… most programs are by commercial necessity designed to 
be watched by large and heterogeneous audiences in a relatively non-selective 
fashion.  Network shares decline as ‘new’ technologies promise (and allow) 
an expansion in diversity and choice, but this has been accompanied by 
decreased diversity in ownership and greater concentration of production and 
control, with little diversification evident in programming.  (Shanahan et al., 
1999, p. 30)  
 
Still, the contention that “if cultivation research is to remain current, it will have to 
accommodate, rather than subordinate, notions of program diversity and audience selectivity” 
(Bryant, 1986) has not gone unheard in the academic community, and the current trend in 
cultivation research is to investigate the impact—i.e., the cultivating power—of genre-
specific television viewing (e.g., Bilandzic & Rössler, 2004). 
 Many critics have also charged cultivation analysis with neglecting to consider the 
cognitive processes that mediate the relations between input variables, such as media 
messages, and output variables, such as global reality judgments (e.g., Hawkins & Pingree, 
1990); to remedy this shortcoming, Shrum (2009) developed a heuristic processing model of 
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television effects incorporating both the wealth of research that has found evidence of at least 
small-scale cultivation effects (for a summary, see Morgan & Shanahan, 1996) and current 
research on information processing in social cognition.  Shrum's model also accommodates 
source confusion, which has been found to strengthen cultivation effects (Mares, 1996), as 
well as artifacts such as persuasion theory’s “sleeper effect” that have the potential to 
produce or to increase cultivation differentials (e.g., Appel & Richter, 2007).  Most 
importantly, Shrum's (2009) model is testable at every stage, finally resolving the greatest 
claim against cultivation theory—that it is non- (or at least not sufficiently) falsifiable. 
Cultivation Research 
 In describing the cultivation process, Morgan et al. (2009) assert that “most of what 
we know, or think we know, is a mixture of all the stories and images we have absorbed” (p. 
36) and that the labels, therefore, “of ‘factual,’ which may be highly selective, and ‘fictional,’ 
which may be highly realistic, are more questions of style than function” (p. 36).  In short, 
audiences are susceptible to cultivation not only by factual but also by fictional messages; in 
many cases, it can be difficult for viewers even to distinguish between the two.  This 
difficulty is further compounded by source confusion, a  phenomenon in which individuals 
recall information but forget—and subsequently misattribute—the source of that information.  
In an oft-cited experiment, Mares (1996) found strong support for her hypotheses that fiction-
to-news confusion strengthens the cultivation effect (p. 295) and that visually similar stimuli 
cause more source confusions than do visually distinct stimuli (p. 293).  Indeed, as modern 
fictional television programs become increasingly more realistic through the use of 
computer-generated graphics and other high-tech special effects, audiences are likely to face 
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greater quandaries in evaluating media messages and, in turn, greater impact of those 
messages on their global reality judgments. 
 Deutsch and Cavender (2008) specifically addressed this issue with respect to CSI, 
adapting the term “strategic web of forensic facticity” to describe the show's use of authentic-
seeming “wardrobe, sets, and [jargon-laden] dialogue” (p. 45) to depict fictitious science in 
the context of dramatic realism.  The researchers conducted a small-scale content analysis of 
CSI's debut season (2000-2001), citing the rationale that said season “established CSI as a 
dominant force in television crime drama” (p. 37) for the selection.  Deutsch herself served 
as the sole coder, utilizing her background in chemistry to code—among other variables—
assorted markers of forensic realism (e.g., scientific equipment and jargon); the second 
author reviewed a sample of her coding observations as a “methodological safeguard” (p. 38).  
In a qualitative analysis of their data, the authors concluded that police procedurals and 
related media presentations “provide a kind of ideological closure that cloaks the infallibility 
of the police with the mantle of science” (p. 48) and that “such closure tends to forestall 
critical questions about policing in the United States” (p. 48), hinting at the cultivating power 
of crime drama. 
 Also relevant to the proposed research are both the previously mentioned “mean 
world” syndrome and a possible corollary—the “just world” effect.  Many studies have 
demonstrated that exposure to nonfictional television content (e.g., news, “reality” crime 
programs) can cultivate belief in a “mean and dangerous world” (e.g., Signorielli, 1990).  
Recently, however, Appel (2008) found evidence in two questionnaire-based studies (one in 
Germany and another in Austria) of an equal and opposite phenomenon:  exposure to 
fictional television content can cultivate belief in a just world.  “Fictional narratives,” he 
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claims, “depict a world that is guided more by the principle of justice than [is] the real world” 
(p. 64); these depictions, over time, shape audience perceptions of social reality. 
Consider the “CSI Effect,” a modern media buzzword coined to refer to the numerous 
alleged effects of the popular series on society.  The most frequently (if anecdotally) cited of 
these effects causes jurors who have been exposed to CSI and similar programs to demand 
“scientific evidence” in every trial—and to refuse to convict when no or “insufficient” 
evidence is presented.  Today's juries “expect forensic evidence in every case, and they 
expect it to be conclusive” (Roane, 2005, p. 2), and both police and prosecutors are feeling 
pressured to cater to these expectations (Roane, 2005). 
 Sadly, the average American appears to lack sufficient scientific understanding to 
discern valid techniques and true experts from hokey pseudoscience and charlatans:  take, for 
example, the case of the late Fred Zain, a lab chemist who in the 1990s was discovered to 
have falsified enough forensic evidence over the course of his 13-year career to bring the 
convictions of more than one hundred people into doubt.  And the list goes on:  forensic 
“experts” have pushed ear prints, lip prints, and handwriting analysis, among other 
questionable techniques, “with degrees of certainty that just don't exist” (Roane, 2005, p. 
6)—a fact that individuals under the influence of the “CSI Effect” are apparently unable or 
unwilling to accept.  “It is comforting to be lulled into a false sense of security about the 
infallibility of science,” asserts Lee (2007, p. 22). 
 Only a small number of empirical tests of the “CSI Effect” have been carried out; but 
unlike the evidence ever presented in the popular show, the evidence for the existence of any 
such effect remains inconclusive.  In the “first empirical study of jurors designed to 
investigate the existence and extent of the 'CSI Effect,'” Shelton, Kim, and Barak (2006) 
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surveyed 1,027 individuals summoned for jury duty in a Michigan state court over a nine-
week period (p. 332).  The survey questioned subjects about their television viewing habits, 
expectations that scientific evidence would be produced in a trial, and whether they would 
demand such evidence as a condition of a guilty verdict (p. 332).  The results of the study 
suggest that juror expectations of being presented with forensic evidence are generally high 
and that “watching CSI and related programs may marginally increase the expectation of 
scientific evidence in certain types of cases” (p. 358); they do not, however, affirm the 
existence of any direct or causative “CSI Effect.”  
 Schweitzer and Saks (2007) tested the “CSI Effect” in a similar but smaller-scale 
study in which a “simulated transcript of a criminal trial in which the principal item of 
inculpatory evidence was hair recovered from a ski mask…  left at the crime scene by the 
perpetrator” (p. 361) was presented to a pool of 48 jury-eligible university students.  Subjects 
were asked to read the transcript and complete a questionnaire assessing “their perceptions of 
both the trial as a whole and the forensic… evidence specifically” (p. 362); they were then 
asked about the frequency with which they viewed police procedurals and other crime-
themed programs.  While a number of differences did emerge between forensics program 
viewers and non-viewers (viewers rated themselves as better informed about forensic science 
and reported greater confidence in their verdicts, for example), some of the differences were 
not statistically significant; and the most important conclusion drawn from the study was that 
further testing of the “CSI Effect” would be necessary to determine if and how crime drama 
programs are affecting audiences. 
 While the “CSI Effect” remains unsubstantiated, it has been shown that the media 
play an integral role in shaping viewers' (and, by extension, public) perceptions of science 
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and technology (S&T), due largely to the fact that when formal science education ends, mass 
media become the primary—and sometimes the only—source of scientific information for 
the general public (e.g., Brossard & Shanahan, 2006; Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, & Signorielli, 
1981; Miller, Augenbraun, Schulhof, & Kimmel, 2006; Nisbet, Scheufele, Shanahan, Moy, 
Brossard, & Lewenstein, 2009).  Current research on the relationships between and among 
science, the media, and society comprises two primary domains of inquiry:  “(a) images of 
science, technology, and scientists in the media and (b) media effects on public perceptions 
of science and technology” (Nisbet et al., 2009, p. 586).  Extant measures of American civic 
scientific literacy and attitudes toward S&T such as the National Science Board's Science and 
Engineering Indicators (NSB, 2008) have identified the two ends of the public opinion 
spectrum with regard to science and technology:  reservation (apprehension about the 
dangers of S&T) and promise (expectations about the benefits of S&T).  Perhaps incidentally 
(or indeed perhaps not), these poles correspond nicely with the two dominant media 
depictions of S&T—terrifying (e.g., Dr. Frankenstein and his monster) and nigh omnipotent 
(e.g., the forensic heroes of CSI and other police procedurals).   
 Introducing a media effects-specific model for public perceptions of science and 
technology, Nisbet et al. (2009) analyzed cross-sectional survey data from the 1999 Science 
and Engineering Indicators, employing structural equation modeling techniques to test 
relationships between variables.  The researchers concluded that nonfiction science-specific 
programming (e.g., National Science Foundation-funded Bill Nye the Science Guy) can play 
a positive role in public understanding of science and technology, but that such educational 
programming efforts  
are overwhelmed by the massive popularity of science fiction, science fantasy, 
paranormal mystery shows, and other general television content that caters to 
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a ready-made audience for storytelling that often distorts science as either 
scary or omnipotent, while apparently inhibiting public understanding. (p. 
604) 
 
 The results of Nisbet et al.'s study assert the media’s role in influencing audience 
understanding of S&T.  Given the premises of cultivation theory, it seems reasonable to infer 
that this understanding—whether complete or incomplete, accurate or inaccurate—would 
necessarily and in turn influence viewers’ reception and interpretation of relevant media 
messages by determining or affecting their abilities and motivation to process information 
(for a summary of the heuristic processing model of television effects, see Shrum, 2009).  
This same, cultivated understanding (i.e., scientific literacy) would then serve to moderate 
other cultivation effects, such as—for example—those on viewers' perceptions of the 




Scientific literacy—also referred to as science literacy, scientific and technological 
literacy, and public understanding of science, usually interchangeably—is a programmatic 
concept, “a good that educators, scientists, and politicians want for citizens and society” 
(Norris & Phillips, 2009, p. 271).  As such, its meaning has been the subject of perpetual 
debate, and countless educators, scientists, social scientists, politicians, and public opinion 
researchers have proposed as many interpretations since the term's inception in the late 1950s 
(Hurd, 1958; McCurdy, 1958).  None of these attempts, however, “has yielded anything that 
even approaches universal acceptance” (DeBoer, 2000, p. 582), and some have even 
confessed that “scientific literacy” may in fact be no more than a mere slogan to rally public 
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support for more and better science education (Bybee, 1997).  The only true consensus 
surfacing throughout the literature seems to be that some degree of scientific literacy is 
necessary for citizens of modern, industrial, and—especially—democratic societies (e.g., 
Miller 2004).               
 Perhaps the best place to begin an overview of scientific literacy (SL), then, is by 
defining literacy in a general sense; for it is here that the first divergence in 
conceptualizations emerges.  The word literate has two applicable but very different 
meanings:  1) possessing the ability to read and write, and 2) demonstrating knowledge or 
competence (Merriam-Webster online, n.d.).  While terminology comprising literacy (the 
state of being literate) and an antecedent modifier (e.g., scientific, financial) does by and in 
its very construction indicate the latter denotation, there are some who have chosen to work 
from the former, defining scientific literacy as the ability to read and write about science (e.g., 
Norris & Phillips, 2003, 2009; Resnick & Resnick, 1977).  Norris and Phillips (2009) have 
dubbed this notion “the fundamental sense of scientific literacy” (emphasis original; p. 271); 
and they contrast it with other conceptions, which they accuse of being “wedded solely to the 
derived sense of scientific literacy—that is, to knowledge of the substantive content of 
science and to knowledge about science” (emphasis original; p. 271).   
 The two senses are not necessarily considered to be mutually exclusive, however, and 
there are some who have attempted to integrate fundamental into otherwise derived notions 
of scientific literacy (to borrow Norris and Phillips' terms):  Miller (2000), for example, set 
the bar for SL at a level of understanding adequate to read the science section of The New 
York Times.  Shen (1975) suggested that the public understanding of science could be 
usefully divided into three categories—practical, cultural, and civic scientific literacy—and 
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defined the latter as comprehension of scientific terms and constructs sufficient to read a 
daily newspaper or magazine; and Brossard and Shanahan (2006) pitched “the understanding 
of scientific and technical terms, or the mastery of scientific and technical vocabulary” (p. 
48) as a “completely different approach to…  conceptualization” (p. 48) upon which to base a 
new scientific literacy scale.  Still, those willing to divorce scientific literacy from its 
implications of knowledge pertaining to and competency with science are comparatively few, 
and critics of fundamental SL contend that  
while communication skill is a crucial component of literacy…  it is difficult 
to see how any approach to STL is bound simply by language, or by a 
dominance of the written text.  Language ability, as a component of 
communication skill, is… common to learning in all subject areas, not just 
science…  Scientific and technological literacy is much more than language 
proficiency.  (Holbrook and Rannikmae, 2007, p. 1356) 
 
Substantially larger and more prevalent than the ideological realm of “fundamental” 
scientific literacy is that of “derived” scientific literacy, in which the plenitude of oft-
intersecting SL conceptualizations are based in the second definition of literacy—
demonstrating knowledge or competency.  The remaining two components of Shen's (1975) 
aforementioned tripartite notion of scientific literacy—practical and cultural SL—fall into 
this category:  Shen defined practical (also called consumer) scientific literacy as the 
“possession of the kind of scientific knowledge that can be used to help solve practical 
problems” (p. 46) and cultural scientific literacy as scientific inquiry “motivated by a desire 
to know something about science as a major human achievement” (p. 49).  The American 
Association for the Advancement of Science's (AAAS, 1993) and the National Research 
Council's (NRC, 1996) definitions both emphasize the ability to utilize scientific knowledge 
and principles in problem solving.  The NRC's (1996) inclusive conceptualization also 
stresses the capacity “to evaluate the quality of scientific information on the basis of its 
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source and the methods used to generate it” (p. 22), which, in turn, is closely related to the 
notion of scientific literacy as an understanding of what counts as science (DeBoer, 2000; 
Hurd, 1998; Lee, 1997) and the ability to distinguish science from nonscience and 
pseudoscience, such as astrology (Mayer, 1997; Miller, 2000; Shortland, 1988). 
 Many conceptual definitions of scientific literacy (including most of those discussed 
above) are specifically directed at describing and indeed prescribing the requisite knowledge 
for what is known as civic (or adult) scientific literacy, most frequently defined as the 
ability—or at least the potentiality—to function as a member of society and to participate in 
science-based social issues (e.g., Kolsto, 2000; Miller, 1983, 1998, 2000, 2004; NRC, 1996; 
Roth & Lee, 2004).  Miller (2000) elaborates, asserting that because  
it is primarily at the point of controversy that the public becomes involved in 
the resolution of scientific and technological disputes, it is clear that 
meaningful citizen participation requires a level of civic scientific literacy 
sufficient to understand the essential points of competing arguments and to 
evaluate or assess these arguments.  (p. 24) 
 
While accepting in general the idea of civic scientific literacy, physicist Shamos 
(1995) argued that true scientific literacy is not achievable for most individuals and that, for 
this reason, an acceptable conceptualization of scientific literacy for non-scientists must 
necessarily include the awareness of and the ability to deal with scientific experts and 
expertise; he even went so far as to suggest that science policy should be removed from the 
democratic process and placed in the more capable hands of a science court.  Miller (2000), 
however, criticized Shamos for being “unable to step outside his own scientific training” and 
failing to recognize “that the general political institutions of society are extremely reluctant 
to exclude areas of decision-making from democratic influence, as shown in the uneasy 
experiment with independent regulatory commissions for securities, trade practices, and 
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communications over the last four decades” (p. 25).  While Shamos is not infrequently cited, 
his “radical” (DeBoer, 2000) views and proposals seem to attract more controversy than 
support.   
 Civic scientific literacy represents an ideal for adults (i.e., those of voting age), but its 
foundations are laid in adolescence, and most of the remainder of extant conceptions of 
scientific literacy can be found in compilations of educational standards (e.g., Council of 
Ministers of Education, Canada (CMEC), 1997; NRC, 1996) and assessments of student 
scientific knowledge and reasoning (e.g., Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD), 2007a, 2007b, 2009).  There is, unsurprisingly, a great deal of 
overlap among the constructs constituting SL for adolescents and SL for adults; in the case of 
student scientific literacy, however, greater emphasis is placed on rote knowledge of 
scientific facts.  For this reason, the divergence between civic (adult) scientific literacy and 
educational (adolescent) scientific literacy is most apparent not in the conceptualizations but 
in the operationalizations of SL. 
Measuring Scientific Literacy 
 Scientific literacy is widely regarded as ill-defined, diffuse, and difficult to measure 
(e.g., Champagne & Lovitts, 1989); DeBoer (2000) even went so far as to suggest that it is 
impossible to quantify: 
[S]cientific literacy is about the public's understanding of science.  That 
understanding is open-ended and ever-changing.  It is organic, not static.  
Because its parameters are so broad, there is no way to say when it has been 
achieved.  There can be no test of scientific literacy because there is no body 
of knowledge that can legitimately define it.  To create one is to create an 
illusion.  (p. 597) 
 
Still, there is no shortage of available SL scales, and movements to assess civic and 
educational scientific literacy can be traced back to before the 1957 launch of the Sputnik I 
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and subsequent “Space Race” (for historical context, see, e.g., DeBoer, 2000; Miller, 1983).  
In the interest of relevance and parsimony, only presently active instruments specifically 
designed to gauge scientific literacy in the United States (without excluding comparative 
international assessments, provided that they are administered in the U.S.  and in English) 
will be discussed below. 
Civic Scientific Literacy 
 In 1978, the National Science Foundation (NSF) selected Jon Miller and Kenneth 
Prewitt to devise a test of public understanding of and attitudes toward science and 
technology for use in the National Science Board's (NSB) Science and Engineering 
Indicators (SEI) series (Miller, 2004).  In the resulting 1979 study, respondents were asked to 
report whether they had a clear understanding, a general sense, or no understanding at all of 
what it means to study something scientifically (Miller, 2004); those selecting the first option 
were then asked in an open-ended question to explain the nature of scientific inquiry.  From 
an analysis of the responses conducted by a set of independent coders, Miller (1983, 2004) 
estimated that only 14 percent of U.S. adults would be able to provide an acceptable answer 
to the question. 
 Miller is now the Director of the International Center for the Advancement of 
Scientific Literacy at Northwestern University, and his work has been particularly influential 
in the domain of empirical research on civic scientific literacy.  He continues to be involved 
in the design of the Science and Engineering Indicators (the surveys are still carried out 
approximately every other year); and since 1979, the size and scope of the SEI instruments 
have been expanded to include more knowledge and attitudinal items as well as a greater 
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number of open-ended inquiries (Miller, 2000).  Table 1 (below) depicts a sample set of 
items from the 2008 Indicators.          
TABLE 1: SAMPLE SEI ITEMS, 2008 
 
Item  (Response/Options) 
All radioactivity is man-made.   (false) 
Lasers work by focusing sound waves.   (false) 
Electrons are smaller than atoms.   (true) 
Antibiotics kill viruses as well as bacteria.   (false) 
How long does it take for the earth to go around the sun?   (one year) 
It is not important for me to know about science in my daily life.   (strongly disagree to strongly agree) 
Note: adapted from NSB (2008) 
 Working from the SEI database, Miller (1998, 2000) identified two operationalizable 
dimensions of scientific literacy:  a construct (i.e., vocabulary) dimension reflecting a 
knowledge of terms such as one might need to read the science section of a newspaper, and a 
nature dimension reflecting an understanding of the essence of scientific inquiry.  “Although 
it is not reasonable to expect a scientifically literate citizen to be able to design or conduct an 
experiment,” Miller (2000) contends, “it is increasingly necessary for citizens and consumers 
to be able to recognize a scientific approach from a nonscientific or pseudoscientific 
approach” (p. 27). 
 Unfortunately, the results of the 2008 survey indicate that “many Americans do not 
give correct answers to basic factual questions about science and questions about the 
scientific inquiry process” and that “Americans' factual knowledge of science has not 
changed much over time” despite continual and significant advancements in science and 
technology (NSB, 2008).  On a more positive note, attitudinal findings over the years have 
demonstrated that while many Americans have some (usually moral) reservations about 
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science and technology, U.S. citizens as a whole demonstrate a positive attitude about the 
power (sometimes misconstrued as omnipotence) of science (NSB, 2008).   
 Critics of the Science and Engineering Indicators and comparable measures of civic 
scientific literacy are as numerous at least as the scales themselves (e.g., Allum, Sturgis, 
Tabourazi, & Smith, 2008; Vaccarezza, 2007; Wynne, 1991; Ziman, 1991).  Vaccarezza 
(2007) contends that such measures “constitute a field of not stable knowledge types, with 
important theoretical gaps and inaccuracies, and with widely recognized methodological 
weaknesses” (p. 143).  Nevertheless, the SEI is generally considered to be the best available 
national and international assessment of public understanding of and attitudes toward science 
and technology, and it is widely cited throughout the literature on adult scientific literacy 
(e.g., Nisbet et al., 2009). 
Student Scientific Literacy 
 In the institutional standard-ruled domain of education, tests of student proficiency in 
science (and indeed in every other academic subject) are never in short supply.  Many of 
these tests, such as New York's Regents Exams and Georgia's High School Graduation Test, 
endeavor to measure not any sense of subject literacy per se but rather a general mastery of 
explicitly and most often narrowly delineated programs of study; other, nationally 
standardized tests such as the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) Subject Tests are almost as 
limited in scope, testing nationally as opposed to regionally imposed curricula.  The 
Longitudinal Study of American Youth (LSAY), implemented in 1986 and funded by the 
National Science Foundation, was designed to study student interest and competence in 
science and mathematics; the study parallels the Science and Engineering Indicators in many 
26 
 
respects but aims only to measure students' achievement in science, not their scientific 
literacy (Miller, 2000). 
 According to most experts, the best available evaluation of educational scientific 
literacy is the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) 4 
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) (e.g., Sadler & Zeidler, 2009).  
Unlike examinations born of institutional accountability systems,  
PISA is not limited to measuring students' mastery of specific science content.  
Instead, it measures the capacity of students to identify scientific issues, 
explain phenomena scientifically and use scientific evidence as they encounter, 
interpret, solve and make decisions in life situations involving science and 
technology…  In order to participate fully in today's global economy, students 
need to be able to solve problems for which there are no clear rule-based 
solutions and also to communicate complex scientific ideas clearly and 
persuasively.  PISA has responded to this by designing tasks that go beyond 
the simple recall of scientific knowledge.  (OECD, 2007a, p. 33) 
 
 By one measure of the 2006 PISA, American students ranked behind those of twenty 
other industrialized nations, falling noticeably short of average (OECD, 2007b).  These 
results stand in contrast to those of recent international tests of adult scientific literacy, in 
which American citizens performed well relative to citizens of other industrialized nations 
(Miller, 2004).  They do, however, seem fairly consistent with the U.S.'s nonetheless dismal 
civic scientific literacy rate:  “no pride can be taken,” Miller (2004) asserts, “in a finding that 
four out of five Americans cannot read and understand the science section of the New York 





                                                 
4The OECD is an international organization headquartered in Paris, France and of which 34 countries (including 
the United States) are members.  For more information, see http://www.oecd.org. 
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TABLE 2: SAMPLE PISA ITEMS, 2006 
Read the following newspaper article and answer the questions that follow. 
 
The History of Vaccination 
 
        Mary Montagu was a beautiful woman.  She survived an attack of smallpox in 1715 but she was left 
covered with scars.  While living in Turkey in 1717, she observed a method called inoculation that was 
commonly used there.  This treatment involved scratching a weak type of smallpox virus into the skin of 
healthy young people who then became sick, but in most cases only with a mild form of the disease.   
 
        Mary Montagu was so convinced of the safety of these inoculations that she allowed her son and daughter 
to be inoculated. 
 
        In 1796, Edward Jenner used inoculations of a related disease, cowpox, to produce antibodies against 
smallpox.  Compared with the inoculation of smallpox, this treatment had less [sic] side effects and the treated 





What kinds of diseases can people be vaccinated against? 
A. Inherited diseases like haemophilia. 
B. Diseases that are caused by viruses, like  
     polio. 
C. Diseases from the malfunctioning of the  
     body, like diabetes. 
D. Any sort of disease that has no cure. 
 
Give one reason why it is recommended that young children 
and old people, in particular, should be vaccinated against 
influenza (flu).   
 
 
(response referring to the young and/or old 
having weaker immune systems than other 
people) 
 
The effectiveness of unconventional treatments for diseases 
should be subject to scientific investigation. 
 
 
(strongly disagree to strongly agree) 
Note: adapted from OECD (2007a) 
 Some scholars, such as Sadler and Zeidler (2009), “applaud the efforts of the PISA 
team to create an assessment program that moves beyond more traditional, and typical, 
approaches to science testing” (p. 919); others criticize the PISA as a methodological failure, 
arguing that it does not and indeed cannot measure what it claims to measure:  “PISA 
assesses, with some degree of reliability, knowledge and skills for PISA.  No more, no less” 




Scientific Literacy and Media Effects Research 
 Scientific literacy is, again, a programmatic concept, and the ultimate goal of every 
definition (conceptual or operational) discussed hitherto is to advance an inherently 
prescribed meaning or measure of SL.  The applicability of such definitions in mass 
communication research, therefore, is problematic:  because media scholars presumably aim 
only to understand scientific literacy in the context of media effects paradigms (i.e., as an 
independent, dependent, or moderating variable) and not—at least in any immediate sense—
to effect a scientifically literate populace, a non-normative definition of SL is both necessary 
and proper for communication research.  But from which of the many and varied conceptions 
of scientific literacy, then, should an appropriate measure be drawn?     
The notion of “fundamental” SL provides an inadequate framework for media effects 
studies, as viewers’ abilities to read and write about science are hardly universally 
consequential in such research and are, in many cases, entirely inconsequential:  for example, 
audiences do not have to be able to read or write about science to be able to engage with or 
even to understand, say, a television news report about an influenza epidemic or a 
documentary on extinct birds. 
In addition to the issue of relevance and in agreement with Holbrook and 
Rannikmae’s (2007) criticism, it is prudent to point out that by the fundamental definition of 
SL, a Polish professor of physics would no longer be considered scientifically literate were 
he to travel to Rome, assuming he or she were unable to read and write Italian.  This example 
illustrates what is perhaps the greatest weakness in those conceptualizations of SL rooted 
only in the most rudimentary meaning of literacy.    
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 The notion of “derived” scientific literacy encompasses two distinct conceptual and 
operational divisions—civic and educational SL.  The latter, devised to test adolescents’ rote 
knowledge of scientific facts and principles, is insufficient for general communication 
research, which demands a measure of scientific literacy applicable across demographics.  
The former, however, designed to evaluate individuals’ potential to take part in science-
related social discourse, falls more closely in line with the needs and goals of media 
research—especially in light of the fact that civic SL assessments typically include attitudinal 
items.  Still, the greater part of extant derived scientific literacy measures stem from subjects’ 
scores on what are, in effect, science exams. 
The creation and administration of appropriate, generalized science tests to 
participants in media effects studies would be, at best, impractical; at worst, it would be 
impossible.  As is plain from the literature, there is very little consensus as to how to define, 
prescribe, effect, or calculate SL; the greater difficulty for communication researchers thus 
lies not in the selection or synthesis of an acceptable conceptualization of SL but in the 
development of a valid measure.  Scientific literacy is, however, a knowledge-based 
construct, and knowledge is far too complex an abstraction to be treated merely as a running 
tally of correct answers to factual questions.   
 
Subjective Knowledge 
“Research in metacognition has found that knowledge about one’s own knowledge 
plays an important role in a wide variety of processing tasks” (Park, Gardner, & Thukral, 
1988, p. 401).  This subjective knowledge—also called (self-) perceived knowledge and 
feeling of knowing—is the knowledge one believes oneself to have, and it results from the 
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human capacity for metacognition (e.g., Park, 2001).  Of course, a subjective impression of 
knowledgeability “does not necessarily imply [the possession of] any concrete knowledge” 
(Park, 2001, p. 419), and it is not at all uncommon for perceived and objective knowledge to 
be discrepant; indeed, many studies have demonstrated a tendency for the two to be 
“miscalibrated” (Alba & Hutchinson, 2000).  Perhaps unsurprisingly, people’s subjective 
knowledge tends to exceed their actual knowledge, a phenomenon referred to as the illusion 
of knowing. This phenomenon is so well-documented that, in a comprehensive review of 
empirical research on knowledge calibration, Alba and Hutchinson (2000) go so far as to 
pronounce that “overconfidence [in one’s knowledge]… can be adopted by researchers as a 
stylized fact about human cognition” (p. 123).   
 Perceptions of knowledgeability about a given topic most likely arise from familiarity 
with that topic (e.g., Park, 2001), as “information made recently familiar may be [mistakenly] 
attributed to long-term knowledge” (Alba & Hutchinson, 2000, p. 143).  With respect to mass 
communication, Park (2001) explains that “as exposure increases, media audiences may 
increasingly recognize frequently portrayed events as familiar, without necessarily gaining 
knowledge” (p. 419).  In a sense, then, perceived knowledge is cultivated (quite possibly at a 
higher rate than is actual knowledge) by exposure to relevant information, factual or fictional 
(e.g., Park, 2001).  Researchers have thus come to posit that “the sheer ubiquity of the mass 
media might contribute to a public that feels sufficiently informed” (Salwen & Driscoll, 1995, 
p. 270)—a public “assured” by the messages pouring ceaselessly forth from the Information 
Era’s nigh-omnipresent media (e.g., Salwen & Driscoll, 1995).  Heavier users of media, 
therefore, “can develop an illusion of knowing more about the issues covered in the media, as 
compared to those who use the media less frequently” (Park, 2001, p. 419).   
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In addition to the all-but-inevitable quantitative disparities between people’s 
subjective and objective knowledge, the two knowledge types appear to have somewhat 
different effects on cognitive processing (e.g., Alba & Hutchinson, 1987, 2000; Park & 
Lessig, 1981; Raju, Lonial, & Mangold, 1995).  The results of an experiment by Nabi, 
Roskos-Ewoldsen, and Dillman Carpentier (2008), for example, suggest that perceived 
knowledge promotes deeper information processing than does actual knowledge:  “in other 
words, it doesn’t matter what you know so much as what you think you know” (p. 193).   
In their analysis, Nabi et al.  (2008) stress the importance of understanding “the 
potential negative consequences of those who believe themselves to be knowledgeable but 
who in fact are not, or worse, have misinformation on which they might potentially act (or 
not act)” (p. 198), a concern reminiscent of those voiced in both popular and academic 
literature on the alleged “CSI Effect.” After all, what jurors think they know about forensic 
evidence could, at least in theory, tip the scale between exculpation and a guilty verdict in a 
criminal trial.  Likewise, what crime drama viewers think they know about forensic science 
could make the difference between positive and negative assessments of the criminal justice 
system. 
Of course, the importance of subjective knowledge neither overrules nor cancels out 
that of its objective counterpart, which undisputedly plays a role in cognitive processing and 
is undeniably relevant to any research involving knowledge-based constructs.  And while it is 
not always practical nor even possible to quantify an individual’s topical knowledge, it is 
certainly feasible to look for established indicators of such knowledge:  one might classify an 
individual as scientifically literate, for example, based upon his or her job title (e.g., brain 




RESEARCH QUESTIONS, HYPOTHESES, AND RATIONALE 
 
Review of the literature on cultivation and scientific literacy renders apparent the fact 
that there is yet a shortage of empirical studies on how forensics-focused police procedural 
programs influence audience perceptions of the effectiveness of the criminal justice system 
and especially on the manner in which viewer scientific literacy moderates the cultivation 
process.  This study examined both of the above and was guided by the following research 
questions and hypotheses: 
RQ1: Is there a relationship between crime drama viewing and perceptions of 
the effectiveness of the U.S. criminal justice system? 
 
As Zillmann (1980) notes, the television world is often distorted not toward danger 
but toward safety:  after all, on television, the “good guys” almost always triumph over the 
“bad guys,” restoring law and order to the land and bringing justice to its people.  Indeed, it 
follows from the literature that exposure to the “just world” and infallible science of 
programs such as CSI should cultivate positive perceptions (i.e., belief in the effectiveness) 
of the criminal justice system, advancing the first hypothesis:  
H1: Regular crime drama viewers will exhibit greater belief in the 
effectiveness of the criminal justice system than will non-viewers. 
 
If such phenomena as the “CSI Effect” hold true, however, there may arise a 
polarization of effects in which heavy viewers who have been involuntarily exposed to the 
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reality of the criminal justice system (e.g., through jury duty or personal experience with 
crime) exhibit more negative views of law enforcement stemming from the disparity between 
their real-life experience(s) and their inflated (cultivated) expectations.  Those who have 
been exposed to the criminal justice system for other, generally voluntary reasons (e.g., those 
who work within the system and their close associates), however, would not be anticipated to 
show the same tendency; in fact, it is reasonable to assume that such individuals’ perceptions 
would be predicated more on their personal experiences than on any cultivated expectations. 
RQ2: Is there a relationship between crime drama viewing and actual (ASL) 
and/or perceived (PSL) scientific literacy?   
 
Individuals with higher levels of actual scientific literacy (i.e., objective knowledge of 
science) might be “turned off” to police procedurals by the unintentionally comical 
preposterousness of the phony techniques and technology showcased rampantly throughout 
the genre.  On the other hand, such individuals might also choose to view crime dramas 
precisely to take pleasure in the farce.  For this reason, it is difficult to predict whether and 
how crime drama viewing and ASL will covary; it is reasonable to assume, however, that any 
link between the two is unlikely to be causal—that is, exposure to police procedurals does 
not necessarily make one knowledgeable about science, and knowledgeability about science 
does not necessarily compel one to watch police procedurals. 
Crime drama viewing and perceived scientific literacy (i.e., subjective 
knowledgeability about science), in contrast, are likely to exhibit a positive relationship.  
Television exposure has been demonstrated to be significantly related to the illusion of 
knowing (e.g., Park, 2001; Salwen & Driscoll, 1995), and Schweitzer and Saks (2007), for 
example, found that crime drama viewers rated themselves as having a better understanding 
of forensic science than did non-viewers.  Because regular crime drama viewers will be 
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familiar with the scientific (or perhaps more accurately, the “scientific”) content of such 
programs, they will potentially—albeit unconsciously—misconstrue that familiarity as 
knowledgeability:  
H2: Regular crime drama viewers will evince higher PSL than will non-
viewers.      
 
 In addition to the probable accruement of perceived scientific literacy to police 
procedural viewers, it is worth speculating that individuals already high in PSL might also, 
due to an inherent interest in or sense of facility with science, be more likely to enjoy—and 
hence to elect to watch—science-themed programs.  In a paper exploring the role of uses-
and-gratifications models in genre-specific cultivation research, Bilandzic and Rössler (2004) 
explain that “people regularly turn to television to satisfy their needs, and, in turn, get some 
of their needs actually satisfied, and, in addition, unintended effects (like knowledge or 
beliefs they have not sought after)” (p. 313).  In short, viewers drawn to crime drama as a 
result of PSL are no less subject to the influence of the genre’s recurrent messages; indeed, 
said messages may well reinforce or even further augment such individuals’ pre-established 
sense of scientific literacy.    
RQ3: What is the relationship, if any, between viewer scientific literacy (both 
actual and perceived) and the cultivating effects of television crime drama? 
 
Because individuals higher in actual scientific literacy will presumably have greater 
awareness and understanding of the fictitiousness of science-related content in police 
procedural programs as well as greater motivation and ability to process such content (see 
Shrum, 2009), they are likely to demonstrate a decreased propensity toward source 
confusions and comparatively diminished cultivation effects.  Scientifically literate viewers 
should be less easily “lulled into a false sense of security about the infallibility of [forensic] 
35 
 
science” (Lee, 2007, p. 22) and thus less likely to base attributions toward the criminal justice 
system upon the “just world” of crime drama (maintained largely, of course, through 
scientific heroism).  In the words of Bilandzic and Rössler (2004), “people with higher 
cognitive abilities may just disregard television information as not being appropriate for 
reality judgments—exactly because they have better mental resources” (p. 311).   
Individuals low in ASL, however, would assumably be less able to differentiate 
forensic fact from fiction and more likely to fall victim to source confusions, causing them to 
show comparatively heightened cultivation effects—regardless of their PSL levels.  
Moreover, if subjective knowledge does, as suggested by the results of Nabi et al. (2008), 
promote message processing, viewers with a combination of high PSL and low ASL might 
be most subject to television influence, as they would be predisposed both to absorbing more 
information and to misattributing that information to long-term [objective] knowledge.  Thus, 
it is hypothesized that: 
H3: ASL and PSL will, according to the combination in which they occur, 
moderate the relationship between crime drama viewing and perceived 





METHOD AND MEASURES 
 
Method 
Cultivation is a long-term process of influence, not a short-term process of effects; for 
this reason, cultivation research is frequently conducted via survey.  In keeping with this 
convention, the researcher conducted an analytical web-based survey designed and 
administered using Qualtrics Survey Software.  The questionnaire comprised three primary 
blocks of items assessing television viewing habits, beliefs about and experience with the 
criminal justice system, and scientific literacy; blocks were presented in a random order so as 
to reduce the likelihood of ordering effects.  Questions soliciting demographic and other 
potentially sensitive information (i.e., students’ grades) were placed at the end of the 
instrument.  Finally, no forced-response scheme was implemented anywhere in the survey; 
respondent ns, therefore, vary from item to item. 
Participants 
 E-mail invitations to participate in the study were sent to the university e-mail 
addresses of all undergraduate students at a large Southeastern university (N = 18,184).1 
Response rate was approximately 7.5% (N = 1,365).  Table 3 (below) displays the 
demographic breakdown of respondents. 
 
                                                 
1A list was obtained from the university registrar. 
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TABLE 3: PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS 
 
Agea Genderb Race/Ethnicityc Yeard GPAe 
M = 20.10 Female 70.7% White 78.7% First 31.8% 3.5 – 4.0 30.3% 
SD =  3.48 Male 29.1% Black 7.1% Second 20.7% 3.0 – 3.49 27.9% 
Range: 16–58   Asian 6.6% Third 20.2% 2.5 – 2.99 10.3% 
  Hispanic 3.9% Fourth 22.6% 2.0 – 2.49 2.4% 
  Other 4.4% Fifth+ 4.6% Below 2.0 0.4% 
    No GPA 28.1% 
 
Notes: an = 1161, bn = 1363, cn = 1359, dn = 1363, en = 1358 
It is worth noting that the prevalence of female subjects in the present study (70.7%) is 
greater than the prevalence of female students at the university (58.9%), as is the proportion 
of white subjects (78.7%) to white students (66.3%). 
In addition to the information above, participants were asked to provide their majors, 
which were then categorized as science (e.g., chemistry, biology), social science (e.g., 
political science, linguistics), math/logic (e.g., mathematics, computer science), or other (e.g., 
humanities, undeclared).  Of the responding students (n = 1,361), 27.3% (n = 371) had a 
science major, 53.9% (n = 734) had a social science major, and 3.5% (n = 48) had a 
math/logic major.  In total, 81.7% of respondents (n = 1,112) had at least one science-related 
major. 
 
Variables and Measures 
Television Viewing  
 Subjects were asked to report the amount of time they spend watching television 
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programming2 both on a typical weekday and on a typical weekend day.  The two figures 
were fairly highly correlated (r = .63, p < .01), and a weekly viewing variable was computed.  
Weekly television viewing (n = 1,354) ranged from 0 to 110 hours (M = 10.92, SD = 10.94) 
and was non-normally distributed, with skewness of 2.51 (SE = 0.07) and kurtosis of 11.33 
(SE = 0.13).  In an effort to normalize the distribution, weekly viewing was split into nine 
approximately equal groups, a division determined based upon the fact that almost exactly 
11% of respondents (n = 151) were television non-viewers (i.e., had a weekly viewing time 
of 0).  Table 4 (below) presents the resultant distribution (M = 3.91, SD = 2.56), which has 
skewness of 0.05 (SE = 0.07) and kurtosis of -1.23 (SE = 0.13). 
TABLE 4: WEEKLY TELEVISION VIEWING 
Group 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Hours 0 0–3 3–5 5–7 7–9 9–12 12–16.5 16.5–23 > 23 
n 151 152 170 152 153 148 130 165 133 
% 11.2% 11.2% 12.6% 11.2% 11.3% 10.9% 9.6% 12.2% 9.8% 
 
Note: Ranges are non-inclusive. 
Crime Drama Viewing 
Regular crime drama viewing was measured nominally and discreetly, so as to avoid 
cuing respondents in to the study’s true purpose. 3  Participants were given a set of ten 
television program genres4 (ordered randomly) and asked to select any they watch regularly, 
                                                 
2The questionnaire instructed participants to “consider television programming viewed on the Internet or played 
back on a DVR device (e.g., TiVo), as well.” 
 
3Subjects were told that the aim of the research was “to explore the relationship between young people’s media 
use and their opinions of certain core societal institutions” and that they would be asked to answer questions 
about one of the media, the health care system, the criminal justice system, or the education system (assigned 
randomly).  Of course, all participants received the criminal justice questions.    
 
4 news/informational; comedy; sports; medical drama; reality; children’s programming; crime drama; 
educational/documentary; general drama/romance; science fiction/fantasy 
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explicitly defined as at least once per week; 32.9% (n = 449) identified themselves as regular 
crime drama viewers. 
Participants were also invited to input the names of up to three television shows they 
watch regularly (again, at least once per week) as well as those of up to three of their favorite 
shows.  For regularly watched programs (n = 1,056), 20 different crime drama titles (e.g., 
CSI) and 3 relevant “true crime” titles (e.g., Forensic Files) were named a total of 295 times 
by 236 respondents (22.35%).  For favorite programs (n = 1,200), 20 police procedurals and 
4 reality-type crime shows were mentioned 381 times by 308 subjects (25.67%) (see 
Appendix A for a complete list of these programs).   
Perceived Effectiveness of the Criminal Justice System (PECJS)  
Eight Likert-type items pertaining to the efficacy of the U.S. criminal justice system 
(α = .85) were averaged to create a perceived effectiveness scale (n = 1,335) with a possible 
range of 1 to 5 (M = 3.17, SD = 0.63) and with higher scores indicating greater perceived 
effectiveness.  The scale’s components are summarized in Table 5 (below). 
TABLE 5: PECJS SCALE ITEMS 
Item M SD n 
Strongly Disagree – Strongly Agree    
   The criminal justice system in the United States is effective.    3.14 0.94 1361 
   Local law enforcement in my area is effective. 3.57 0.82 1360 
   Judges are fair and impartial. 3.15 0.89 1362 
   Juries are fair and impartial. 2.86 0.91 1358 
   Police officers are fair and impartial. 2.63 0.95 1358 
   Police officers do their jobs as best they can. 3.50 0.88 1358 
   Most criminal convictions in the United States are correct. 3.40 0.79 1359 
Very Negative – Very Positive    
   My overall impression of the U.S. criminal justice system is… 3.13 0.99 1359 
 
Note: α = .85 
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As a secondary measure of perceived effectiveness, subjects were asked to estimate 
the percentage of violent and non-violent crimes 5  solved (i.e., cases closed) by law 
enforcement in the previous year (2009).  Estimations for violent crime (n = 1,304) ranged 
from 5% to 95% (M = 51.64, SD = 20.17), while those for non-violent crime (n = 1,302) 
ranged from 0% to 99% (M = 52.78, SD = 22.28).  The actual figures are 47.1% and 18.6%, 
respectively (FBI, 2010).   
Respondents’ estimates for violent and non-violent crime were moderately correlated 
with each other (r = .45, p < .01); they were also correlated—albeit surprisingly weakly—
with PECJS (violent crime: r = .21, p < .01; non-violent crime: r = .14, p < .01).   
Experience with the Criminal Justice System (ECJS) 
Participants were asked whether they or anyone close to them had ever had any of 
eleven different types of exposures to the U.S. criminal justice system; affirmative responses 
were then summed to create an experience scale (n = 1,345) with a possible range of 0 to 11 
(M = 3.33, SD = 2.70) and with higher scores indicating broader experience.  Table 6 (below) 








                                                 
5Respondents were provided with the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program’s definitions of violent 
and non-violent crimes. 
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TABLE 6: EXPERIENCE WITH THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Have you or has anyone close to you ever… Yes No n 
   …served on a jury?     52.2% 47.8% 1363 
   …seen a crime being committed? 45.3% 54.7% 1361 
   …reported a crime to the police? 37.8% 62.2% 1362 
   …testified as a witness in a criminal trial? 8.4% 91.6% 1359 
   …observed police as they investigated a crime? 33.4% 66.6% 1362 
   …aided police in investigating a crime? 15.7% 84.3% 1360 
   …been questioned by police regarding a crime? 31.6% 68.4% 1361 
   …been arrested? 23.8% 76.2% 1359 
   …been tried for a criminal offense? 16.0% 84.0% 1361 
   …been personally helped by law enforcement? 46.8% 53.2% 1362 
   …been personally wronged by law enforcement? 20.6% 79.4% 1360 
 
Subjects were also asked about the frequency of their personal interaction (business 
or social) with police officers, forensic scientists, and lawyers and/or judges; the results are 
presented in Table 7 (below).   
TABLE 7: INTERACTION WITH CRIMINAL JUSTICE OFFICIALS 
 
 Frequency of Interaction 
 Never  Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often 
Police Officersa 16.7% 61.6% 17.5% 2.9% 1.2% 
Lawyers/Judgesb 47.6% 35.4% 10.3% 4.1% 2.6% 
Forensic Scientistsc 85.3% 12.9% 1.2% 0.4% 0.1% 
 
Notes: an = 1363, bn = 1362, cn = 1363 
As is apparent from the table, respondents on the whole reported very little personal 
interaction with police officers (78.3% never or rarely), lawyers and/or judges (83% never or 
rarely), and especially with forensic scientists (98.2% never or rarely); there is thus little 
cause to believe that personal connections to or relations with criminal justice officials, a 
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factor not reflected in the ECJS measure, would confound or skew the study’s results.  
Furthermore, subjects’ relatively limited interaction with agents of the criminal justice 
system suggests a greater potential role for television in the formation of PECJS.    
Actual Scientific Literacy (ASL) 
In order to construct a measure of actual scientific literacy from a questionnaire that 
did not include a science test, students were asked to report their average letter grades (A, B, 
C, D, or F) across courses in each of five science-related fields (mathematics, life science, 
physical science, social science, and logic); “not applicable” was provided as an option for 
students who had never taken courses in a given area.  Grades were coded from 0 (N/A; no 
courses) to 6 (A; an ‘A’ average across courses) and then summed across sciences to create 
an ASL measure (n = 1,365) ranging from a possible 0 to 30 (M = 14.48, SD = 6.98). 
The rationale for using grades in science courses (or the lack thereof) as indicators of 
ASL stems primarily from the work of Miller (2007), who tested eight variables thought to 
influence adult SL (age, gender, highest level of education, number of college science 
courses completed, presence of minor children in the household, level of use of informal 
science education resources, employment in a science-related job, and personal religious 
beliefs) in a path analysis and found that the strongest predictor of civic scientific literacy 
was the number of undergraduate science courses taken, with a total effect of .75.  Because 
the present study examined a sample of undergraduate students, however, relying on the 
number of science courses completed as the sole indicator of ASL would result in a measure 
partially dependent upon class standing and heavily biased in favor of upperclassmen; the 
above measure, which incorporates exposure to and performance in science classes and is 
therefore less directly age-dependant, was thus devised.    
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Perceived Scientific Literacy (PSL)  
Participants were asked to respond to 15 Likert-type items assessing their (1) interest 
in, (2) knowledgeability about, and (3) skill at understanding each of the science-related 
subjects enumerated above; a summary is displayed in Table 8 (below).   
TABLE 8: PSL SCALE ITEMS 
Item M SD n 
Strongly Disagree – Strongly Agree    
I am generally interested in or enjoy learning about…      
          Mathematicsa (calculus, geometry, etc.) 2.83 1.34 1363 
          Life Scienceb (biology, ecology, etc.) 3.40 1.26 1363 
          Physical Sciencec (chemistry, physics, etc.) 2.78 1.31 1361 
          Social Scienced (economics, psychology, etc.) 4.10 0.94 1361 
          Logice (computer science, symbolic logic, etc.) 2.81 1.13 1359 
I generally consider myself to be knowledgeable about…    
          Mathematicsa (calculus, geometry, etc.) 3.16 1.23 1360 
          Life Scienceb (biology, ecology, etc.) 3.31 1.14 1360 
          Physical Sciencec (chemistry, physics, etc.) 2.85 1.20 1359 
          Social Scienced (economics, psychology, etc.) 3.83 0.99 1359 
          Logice (computer science, symbolic logic, etc.) 2.61 1.08 1359 
I generally consider myself to be skilled at understanding…    
          Mathematicsa (calculus, geometry, etc.) 3.31 1.27 1362 
          Life Scienceb (biology, ecology, etc.) 3.56 1.12 1360 
          Physical Sciencec (chemistry, physics, etc.) 3.05 1.22 1359 
          Social Scienced (economics, psychology, etc.) 4.04 0.91 1360 
          Logice (computer science, symbolic logic, etc.) 2.95 1.10 1360 
 
Notes: aα = .91, bα = .88, cα = .89, dα = .86, eα = .85  
As is clear from the table, the three PSL dimensions proved to be reliable within all five 
fields (alphas ranged from .85 to .91) and were thus averaged for each.  The resulting scores 
were then summed to create a perceived scientific literacy scale (n = 1,334) with a possible 
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range of 0 to 25 (M = 16.20, SD = 3.25) and with higher scores indicating greater PSL.  As 
might be surmised based upon the subjective knowledge literature, PSL was only weakly 
correlated with ASL (r = .20, p < .01).    
Additional Data for Supplementary Analysis 
In order tentatively to examine students’ impressions about forensic science 
specifically, respondents were asked to indicate their levels of agreement (strongly disagree 
to strongly agree) with three statements reflecting common misperceptions about forensic 
evidence—misperceptions that are most likely perpetuated, at least in part, by crime drama 
programs: 
(1) Most convictions of violent criminals are based on forensic evidence.   
(2) DNA evidence is absolute proof of a person’s guilt.   
(3) The absence of DNA evidence is absolute proof of a person’s innocence. 
 
Finally, as an exploratory measure of the perceived relative value/status of forensic scientists 
as justice operatives, students were invited to rank police officers, lawyers, judges, forensic 
scientists, and witnesses (presented in a random order) according to the relative importance 






RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
Research Questions and Hypothesis Testing 
RQs 1 and 2 were examined using bivariate correlations with two-tailed tests of 
significance.  Table 9 (below) displays the correlation matrix for the study’s key variables. 
TABLE 9: PEARSON’S CORRELATIONS AMONG KEY VARIABLES 
 
TV Viewinga CD Viewingb PECJS ECJS ASL PSL 
TV Viewinga 1 - - - - - 
CD Viewingb .236** 1 - - - - 
PECJS .054* .031 1 - - - 
ECJS -.026 .014 -.116** 1 - - 
ASL -.013 .012 -.010 .041 1 - 
PSL -.063* .014 .133** .050 .204** 1 
Notes: *p < .05; **p < .01; aweekly TV viewing, grouped 0-8 (0 = non-viewers, 8 = heaviest viewers);  
bregular crime drama viewing, dummy coded (0 = non-regular viewers, 1 = regular viewers) 
 
RQ1 asked about the relationship between crime drama viewing and perceptions of 
the effectiveness of the criminal justice system, and H1 predicted that PECJS would be 
higher among those who regularly watch police procedurals.  As is apparent from the table 
above, however, correlation between regular crime drama viewing and PECJS was not 
significant, and association between total television viewing and PECJS was, to say the least, 
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minimal.  Additionally, no significant relationship emerged when correlation between total 
television viewing and PECJS was tested separately for regular (r = .02, p = .63, n = 437) and 
non-regular crime drama viewers (r = .06, p = .07, n = 888).   
Moreover, an independent samples t-test found no significant difference in PECJS 
between regular (M = 3.20, SD = 0.63) and non-regular (M = 3.16, SD = 0.63) police 
procedural viewers, t(1333) = -1.13, p = .26.  The same held true for participants’ estimates 
of the percent of violent and non-violent crimes solved by law enforcement:  estimations for 
violent crime did not differ significantly between regular (M = 52.85, SD = 19.60) and non-
regular (M = 51.03, SD = 20.43) crime drama viewers, t(1302) = -1.54, p = .13, nor did 
estimations for non-violent crime (M = 54.33, SD =  2.42, for regular viewers; M = 52.01, SD 
= 22.18, for non-viewers), t(1300) = -1.77, p = .08.  H1, therefore, was not supported.        
RQ2 regarded the relationship between crime drama viewing and scientific literacy, 
and H2 predicted that regular crime drama viewers would perceive themselves to be more 
scientifically literate than would non-regular viewers.  While PSL scores were indeed slightly 
higher among regular viewers (M = 16.26, SD = 3.10, n = 445) than among non-viewers (M = 
16.16, SD = 3.32, n = 889), the difference was not significant, t(1332) = -0.53, p = .60; H2, 
therefore, was not supported.  The difference in ASL scores between regular crime drama 
viewers (M = 14.60, SD = 6.57, n = 449) and non-viewers (M = 14.42, SD = 7.18, n = 916) 
was also non-significant, t(963.31) = -0.45, p = .65.   
In order to assess whether crime drama viewership varied by scientific literacy level, 
respondents were grouped according to their combinations of high (median and above) or 
low (below median) perceived and actual scientific literacy,1 as summarized in Table 10 
                                                 




(below).  A chi-square analysis did not reveal a significant difference in the distribution of 
regular crime drama viewers among the four groups, χ2 = 1.75, df = 3, p = .63.   
TABLE 10: DISTRIBUTION OF REGULAR CRIME DRAMA VIEWERS BY SCIENTIFIC LITERACY LEVEL 
 High ASL Low ASL 
High PSL n = 431  n = 285  
% Crime Drama Viewers  33.2%  36.5% 
Low PSL n = 293  n = 325  
% Crime Drama Viewers  32.1%  32% 
Note: χ2 = 1.75, df = 3, p = .63  
Moreover, much as was the case with perceived effectiveness, there appeared to be no 
meaningful association between total television viewing and either PSL (r = -.06, p = .02) or 
ASL (r = -.01, p = .63). 
Finally, RQ3 addressed the relationship between viewer scientific literacy and the 
cultivating effects of television crime drama, and H3 predicted that ASL and PSL would 
interact to moderate the cultivation process.  To evaluate the predictive power of television 
viewing (both general and genre-specific), scientific literacy (both actual and perceived), and 
experience for perceived effectiveness, a hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis was 
performed in which PECJS was regressed onto four blocks of variables:  demographics 
(gender and race),2 television viewing (crime drama and total weekly), scientific literacy 
(ASL and PSL), and experience (ECJS).  A summary of the resultant models is presented in 
Table 11 (below).     
 
                                                 
2Age was not included in the regression model as it did not vary much within the sample (87.9% of participants 
were between 18 and 22) and as correlation between age and perceived effectiveness was both infinitesimal and 
non-significant (r = .01, p = .87).  See Appendix B for a table of correlations among demographic and key 




TABLE 11: SUMMARY OF HIERARCHICAL REGRESSION ANALYSIS PREDICTING PECJS 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
Gendera .01 .04 .01 .00 .04 .01 .05 .04 .04 .04 .04 .03 
Raceb  .24 .04 .16** .25 .05 .16** .25 .04 .16** .25 .04 .16** 
Crime Drama Viewingc   .02 .04 .02 .02 .04 .01 .02 .04 .01 
Weekly TV Viewingd   .02 .01 .07* .02 .01 .08** .02 .01 .08** 
Actual SL      .00 .00 -.04 .00 .00 -.04 
Perceived SL      .03 .01 .14** .03 .01 .14** 
Experience            -.03   .01    -.13** 
             
              R2 .024 .029 .047 .064 
F for ∆R2 15.59** 3.58* 12.08** 21.94** 
 
Notes: *p < .05, **p < .01; adummy coded (0 = male, 1 = female) bdummy coded (0 = nonwhite, 1 = white); 
cdummy coded (0 = non-regular viewers, 1 = regular viewers); dgrouped 0-8 (0 = non-viewers,  
8 = heaviest viewers); B = unstandardized coefficients, β = standardized coefficients 
 
All four models significantly predicted perceived effectiveness,3  with each model 
explaining a significantly greater amount of variance than the last.  Race was a significant 
contributor across the board, with white respondents evaluating the criminal justice system 
more favorably than did nonwhite respondents.  It is possible that this discrepancy is at least 
partly a function of the fact that nearly 80% of the study’s subjects were white; an 
independent samples t-test, however, confirms that it is not due to nonwhite participants (M = 
3.19, SD = 2.85, n = 284) having any more experience than white participants (M = 3.36, SD 
= 2.66, n = 1,061) with the criminal justice system, t(1343) = -0.98, p = .33.  ECJS was, 
unsurprisingly, a significant predictor of PECJS, with respondents who reported having more 
experience with the system judging it more harshly.            
                                                 
3Model 1: F(2, 1275) = 15.59, p < .01; Model 2: F(4, 1273) = 9.62, p < .01; Model 3: F(6, 1271) = 10.55, 
p < .01; Model 4: F(7, 1270) = 12.33, p < .01 
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 Weekly television viewing was also a significant predictor of PECJS, with heavier 
viewers evincing more positive views of the justice system; crime drama viewing specifically, 
however, did not appear to be of any consequence.  Participants’ PSL levels, on the other 
hand, did make a difference:  subjects higher in perceived scientific literacy tended to rate the 
justice system as more effective.  ASL did not make a significant contribution. 
Indeed, ASL appears to play a subordinate role to PSL with respect to respondents’ 
assessments of the criminal justice system, and as a secondary test of H3, a 2 x 4 univariate 
ANOVA was performed with crime drama viewing (regular viewer, non-viewer) and SL 
grouping (high ASL/high PSL; high ASL/low PSL; low ASL/high PSL; low ASL/low PSL) 
as independent variables and PECJS as the dependent variable.  While the interaction 
between crime drama viewing and SL grouping was non-significant, F(3, 1298) = 0.78, p 
= .50, a significant main effect did emerge for the latter, F(3, 1298) = 3.32, p < .05.  Scheffé 
post-hoc comparisons for SL grouping indicated that individuals with low ASL but high PSL 
(M = 3.27, SD = 0.60) rated the criminal justice system as significantly more effective than 
did those with low ASL and low PSL (M = 3.11, SD = 0.63) or high ASL but low PSL (M = 
3.10, SD = 0.58).  H3 was not directly supported, as no relationship between police 
procedural viewing and PECJS materialized for SL to moderate; it is clear, however, from 
the relationships among total television viewing, PSL, and ASL revealed in the analyses 
above that scientific literacy (or, at very least, perceived SL) is most likely influential in the 
processing of relevant media messages and the formation of related attitudes and beliefs. 
Supplementary Analysis 
 While participants’ crime drama viewing habits did not appear to have any bearing on 
their evaluations of the criminal justice system as a whole, it seems reasonable to speculate 
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that exposure to crime drama might impact their impressions of forensic science and 
scientists specifically.  Subjects’ responses to the three forensic evidence items are 
summarized in Table 12 (below). 
TABLE 12: FORENSIC EVIDENCE ITEMS 
Item M SD n 
Strongly Disagree – Strongly Agree    
Most convictions of violent criminals are based on forensic evidence.    3.20 0.85 1353 
DNA evidence is absolute proof of a person’s guilt. 2.72 0.97 1361 
The absence of DNA evidence is absolute proof of a person’s innocence. 1.81 0.67 1361 
 
In total, 41.9% of participants agreed and only 21.6% disagreed that most convictions 
of violent criminals are based on forensic evidence; in reality, however, “most” is almost 
certainly a considerable overestimation.  While the impact of physical evidence at the level 
of adjudication is notoriously understudied, a recent project funded by the U.S. Department 
of Justice’s National Institute of Justice (NIJ) and examining a stratified random sample of 
4,205 criminal incidents taking place across five jurisdictions in the year 2003 found that 
none of the study’s measures of forensic evidence were significant predictors of criminal 
conviction for any type of offense (Peterson, Sommers, Baskin, & Johnson, 2010).  The same 
study’s results also indicated that physical evidence is collected in well under half of reported 
incidents for most types of crime and that not all collected evidence is ever submitted to or 
analyzed by a crime laboratory, a point that will be addressed in greater detail shortly 
(Peterson et al., 2010).    
A smaller proportion of subjects—25.1%—agreed that DNA evidence is irrefutable 
proof of an individual’s guilt (it is not; see, e.g., The Innocence Project, 2011), while 50% 
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correctly disagreed.  Only 1.5% agreed that a lack of DNA evidence is irrefutable proof of a 
suspect’s innocence; 88.2% correctly disagreed.      
Surprisingly, independent samples t-tests again revealed no significant difference 
between police procedural viewers and non-viewers for any of the forensic evidence items.  
Regular viewers (M = 3.24, SD = 0.87, n = 449) were not significantly more likely than non-
regular viewers (M = 3.18, SD = 0.84, n = 904) to agree that most convictions for violent 
crimes are based on forensic evidence, t(865.28) = -1.10, p = .27; that DNA evidence is 
absolute proof of guilt (viewers: M = 2.69, SD = 0.95, n = 448; non-viewers: M = 2.74, SD = 
0.98, n = 913), t(1359) = 0.86, p = .40; or that a lack of DNA evidence is absolute proof of 
innocence (viewers: M = 1.81, SD = 0.67, n = 449; non-viewers: M = 1.81, SD = 0.67, n = 
912), t(1359) = 0.10, p = .92.    
Moreover and indeed even more surprisingly, respondents’ dispositions on the three 
forensics items do not appear to a function of—nor even related to—their scientific literacy, 
as indicated by the nearly nonexistent and mostly non-significant correlations displayed in 
Table 13 (below). 
TABLE 13: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN FORENSICS ITEMS AND SL VARIABLES 
Item ASL PSL Science Majora 
1: Convictions Based on Forensic Evidence .012 .058* .059* 
2: DNA as Proof of Guilt .006 .017 .046 
3: Lack of DNA as Proof of Innocence -.008 -.087** -.054* 
Notes: *p < .05; **p < .01; adummy coded (0 = student has no science major, 1 = student has a science major) 
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In addition, two univariate ANOVAs comparing responses to the first and second items, 
respectively, by SL grouping did not reveal significant main effects.4 An ANOVA for item 
three, however, did, F(3, 1328) = 3.77, p < .05, and Scheffé post-hoc comparisons revealed 
that individuals with high ASL and high PSL (M = 1.74, SD = 0.66) were significantly less 
likely than those with high ASL but low PSL (M = 1.90, SD = 0.64) to erroneously agree that 
the absence of DNA evidence is absolute proof of a person’s innocence.    
 Finally, as an exploratory measure, subjects were asked to rank the importance of 
various individuals—including forensic scientists—in solving crimes; the results are 
reproduced in Table 14 (below). 
TABLE 14: PERCEIVED INSTRUMENTALITY IN CRIME SOLVING 
 
 Ranking 
 First  Second Third Fourth Fifth 
     Forensic Scientists 43.6%* 29.3% 17.6% 5.8% 3.7% 
     Police Officers 26.0% 24.4% 26.8%* 12.4% 10.3% 
     Witnesses 20.9% 30.7%* 23.5% 12.3% 12.7% 
     Lawyers 4.8% 8.3% 16.4% 35.3%* 35.2% 
     Judges 4.8% 7.2% 15.8% 34.2% 38.0%* 
 
Notes: n = 1338; *most common ranking  
Interestingly, the majority of participants (72.9%) ranked forensic scientists as being 
most or second most instrumental in solving crimes; in contrast, only about half of 
respondents (50.4%) placed police officers in one of the top two spots.  In actuality, however, 
forensic scientists don’t become involved in what is most likely the majority of criminal 
cases:  Peterson et al. (2010), for example, found that physical evidence was collected in no 
                                                 
4Item 1 (Convictions): F(3, 1321) = 2.41, p = .07; Item 2 (DNA/Guilt): F(3, 1328) = 0.83, p = .48 
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more than 30% of incidents for all crime types but rape (64%) and homicide (97%); 
moreover, not all collected evidence ever made it as far as the lab: 
With the exception of homicides (89%), few of the reported crime incidents 
had forensic evidence that was submitted to crime laboratories.  While the rate 
of submission of evidence for rape was 32%, submission rates in assaults, 
burglaries, and robberies were under 15% of reported offenses.  (p. 8)       
 
 Bivariate correlations revealed no meaningful association between respondents’ 
ratings of forensic scientists and their total weekly television viewing (r = .01, p = .68); the 
same held true for both crime drama viewers (r = .07, p = .12, n = 442) and non-viewers (r 
= .00, p = .89, n = 886) when examined separately.  Finally, an independent samples t-test 
found no significant difference in rankings between regular (M = 1.92, SD = 1.09, n = 445) 
and non-regular (M = 1.99, SD = 1.09, n = 893) police procedural viewers, t(1336) = 1.07, p 
= .29.  But where, then, did subjects’ inflated notions of forensic scientists’ involvement in 





DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS, AND CONCLUSION 
 
Discussion 
The present study examined relationships between and among undergraduate students’ 
general and genre-specific (i.e., crime drama) television viewing, perceptions of the 
effectiveness of the U.S. criminal justice system, and perceived and actual scientific literacy.  
The results suggest a positive relationship (albeit rather a modest one) between total 
television viewing and PECJS, a finding consistent with the cultivation hypothesis and 
reflective of the “just world” effect (e.g., Appel, 2008; Zillmann, 1980).  No evidence, 
however, of covariance between crime drama viewing in particular and perceived 
effectiveness of the justice system was manifest in the data.   
Additionally, no association was apparent between police procedural viewing and 
either perceived or actual scientific literacy, and the prevalence of regular crime drama 
viewers was invariant across SL categories (high/low ASL x high/low PSL).  Perceived 
scientific literacy was, however, positively associated with PECJS; actual scientific literacy, 
on the other hand, was ostensibly unrelated. 
Finally, both total television viewing and PSL—as well as experience with the 
criminal justice system and participant race—were shown to be significant predictors of 
perceived effectiveness.  Even so, the strength of this finding was minimal, as all four 
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variables together were able to explain only about 6% of the variance in PECJS.  In summary, 
evidence of global cultivation effects was limited, and evidence of any genre-specific effects 
was—in a perplexing but not unprecedented turn of events—conspicuously absent.      
 Prior research on the cultivating power of crime drama has also consistently stopped 
(or, as in the case of this study, fallen) short of corroborating the likes of the “CSI effect” 
(e.g., Dowler, 2003; Schweitzer & Saks, 2007; Shelton et al., 2006).  Dowler (2003), for 
example, upon analyzing a sample from the 1995 National Opinion Survey on Crime and 
Justice (NOSCJ)1 to assess relationships between media consumption and various crime- and 
justice-related attitudes, was forced to conclude that “perception of police effectiveness is not 
related to media consumption” (p. 120). 
 Nonetheless, it is plain from the present as well as a host of related studies that public 
valuation of forensic science and scientists is generally high, often to the point of being 
inflated.  After finding only tenuous associations between police procedural viewing and 
jurors’ expectations regarding scientific evidence (which, incidentally, were both widespread 
and not infrequently unreasonable), Shelton et al. (2006) speculated that such expectations 
may be unrelated to exposure to any specific types of television programming and instead be 
“the result of broader changes in popular culture related to advancements in both technology 
and information distribution” (p. 368).  They go on to argue that as both information 
exchange within the scientific community and the flow of new findings into the public sphere 
from the scientific community are increasingly facilitated by new and better technology, not 
only is more science accomplished, it is also assimilated into popular culture at previously 
unimaginable rates.  “Ordinary people [now] know, or at least think they know,” the 
                                                 
1The NOSCJ is a random (CATI) telephone survey of adults living in the continental United States.  The survey 
is cross-sectional and addresses a broad range of crime-related issues. 
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researchers contend, “more about science and technology from what they have learned in the 
media than they ever learned in school” (Shelton et al., 2006, p. 363)—a view consistent 
with the literature on public perceptions of science and technology (e.g., Brossard & 
Shanahan, 2006; Miller et al., 2006; Nisbet et al., 2009). 
While the lack of a relationship between crime drama viewing and perceived 
effectiveness was unexpected, the association between experience and PECJS was wholly 
unsurprising, as was its inverse nature.  In the television world, “forensic laboratories are 
fully staffed with highly trained personnel, stocked with a full complement of state-of-the-art 
instrumentation and rolling in the resources to close every case in a timely fashion” (Houck, 
2006, p. 1).  In TV land, where there’s a will—or a partial fingerprint lifted from a corpse 
and scanned into a remote computer with a scientist-cum-detective’s mobile phone—there’s 
a way, and justice officials, the gatekeepers of good, are efficient and infallible.  In the real 
world, however, loose ends often remain untied, and more than half of crimes are never 
solved (FBI, 2010); not everyone is brought to justice or to closure, as the case may be.  But 
if one is accustomed to prime time crime—if one possesses, consciously or not, a cultivated 
notion of what the criminal justice system is or should be—it stands to reason that exposure 
to the imperfect truth would result in disappointment.  Indeed, an interesting direction for 
future research would be to investigate the possibility of a “disillusionment differential;” that 
is, whether those with heavier television diets exhibit a greater decrease in PECJS upon 
initial acquisition of personal experience with the system.       
Limitations 
Survey research—like any method—is bound by various limitations, the greatest 
perhaps being the fact that directionality and causation cannot be ascertained from 
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correlational data; it is unclear, for example, whether individuals with higher PSL evaluated 
the justice system more favorably because of their sense of relevant knowledge or whether 
PSL and PECJS were merely cultivated concurrently as a consequence of television viewing.   
The present study was also limited in terms of sampling:  while a census scheme was 
employed to invite students to take part in the study, respondents ultimately self-selected and 
may very well differ from those who declined to participate.  Furthermore, the study’s 
sample was largely homogeneous, with both whites and females overrepresented relative to 
the university’s (already predominantly white and female) undergraduate population.  And 
while undergraduate students do, of course, make for convenient, accessible subjects, data 
collected from them are not generalizable—especially in a study examining such 
characteristics as scientific literacy, which very likely exists at higher levels among 
university students than among the populace at large. 
 Finally, this study was limited—potentially quite severely—by two of its measures: 
crime drama viewing and actual scientific literacy.  A continuous measure of crime drama 
viewing would perhaps have revealed effects undetectable with the dichotomous measure 
herein employed, though it is worth noting that several of the studies cited above that failed 
to find evidence of any “CSI effect” measured crime drama viewing continuously (e.g., 
Shelton et al., 2006).   
 More precarious is the study’s ASL measure.  Actual scientific literacy—a fiercely 
debated and somewhat inchoate collection of objective knowledge—is notoriously difficult 
to measure; some have even called it unquantifiable (e.g., DeBoer, 2000).  While the scale 
devised for and utilized in this research is based on an established predictor of civic scientific 
literacy (i.e., the number of college science courses completed; see Miller, 2007), the 
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modifications incorporated in order to accommodate a sample composed entirely of 
undergraduate students (i.e., performance in science-related courses) are potentially 
problematic—for example, by the study’s ASL measurement scheme, an ‘F’ average across 
classes in six academic subjects2 would equate to an ‘A’ average across courses in one.  As 
81.6% of participants reporting a grade point average (n = 974), however, had GPAs of at 
least 3.0, it is unlikely that many poor science students ended up with high ASL scores.  Still, 
the ASL measure implemented in this study is very much experimental and can—at best—
claim only face validity.   
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, this study—like so much cultivation research before it—offers no more 
than hints at the possibility of television’s influence and indeed raises more questions than it 
answers:  while the fake forensics of popular crime drama programs are plain to see, whether 
they are accompanied by real effects continues to be shrouded in uncertainty.  But unlike the 
tidy investigations of CSI, which almost always end with a mystery solved and a clever one-
liner, this case must remain open long past the final remark—until at last the conundrum of 







                                                 





PARTICIPANTS’ REGULARLY VIEWED AND FAVORITE CRIME PROGRAMS 
Program Title Regular Favorite Totals 
Crime Drama    
     Bones 53 53 106 
     Castle 27 22 49 
     Criminal Minds 20 32 52 
     CSI 5 15 20 
     CSI: Miami 2 3 5 
     CSI: New York 1 1 2 
     Detroit 187 1 - 1 
     Dexter 26 41 67 
     Fringe 13 12 25 
     Hawaii Five-O 1 1 2 
     Law & Order 15 28 43 
     Law & Order: SVU 30 37 67 
     Lie to Me 21 16 37 
     Monk 1 6 7 
     NCIS 30 48 78 
     NCIS: Los Angeles 2 2 4 
     Psych 31 38 69 
      Saving Grace - 1 1 
     The Closer 1 1 2 
     The Mentalist 4 4 8 
     White Collar 2 13 15 
 286 374                                 660 
True Crime    
     48 Hours - 1 1 
     Forensic Files 4 3 7 
     Lock Up 1 1 2 
     The First 48 4 2 6 






CORRELATIONS AMONG DEMOGRAPHIC AND KEY VARIABLES 
Variable TV Viewinga CD Viewingb PECJS ECJS ASL PSL 
Age .099 .024 .005 .090** .099** -.005 
Yearc .135** .046 -.036 .059* .215** -.047 
Genderd -.050 .103** -.016 -.065* -.023 -.211** 
Racee -.121** -.058* .158** -.027 .008 .048 
GPAf -.200** -.095** .038 -.052 .198** .123** 
Sci.  Majorg -.044 -.028 .063* -.027 .143** .316** 
Notes: *p < .05; **p < .01; aweekly TV viewing, grouped 0-8 (0 = non-viewers, 8 = heaviest viewers); bregular 
crime drama viewing, dummy coded (0 = non-regular viewers, 1 = regular viewers); c year in university (1 = 
first, 6 = sixth and above); ddummy coded (0 = male, 1 = female); edummy coded (0 = nonwhite, 1 = white); 
fexcludes students who reported having no GPA (1 = < 2.0, 5 = 3.5 - 4.0); gdummy coded (0 = student does not 
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